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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an order denying plaintiff's
motion to set aside an order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal,

which was transferred from the Utah Supreme Court, under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the lower court did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal for
plaintiff's failure to prosecute?

An appellate court will not

reverse a trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a
judgment unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.
Airkem Intermountain/ Inc., v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d
429, 431 (1973).
2.

Whether plaintiff is barred from raising his claim

regarding the refiling statute because he failed to raise it in
the lower court?

A matter not raised in the trial court may not

be raised for the first time on appeal.

James v. Preston, 746

P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1987):
78-12-40.

Effects of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if
he dies and the cause of action survives, his
representatives, may commence a new action
within one year after the reversal or
failure.

Rule 4-103, Utah Code of Judicial Administration:
Statement of the Rule:
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(1) If a default judgment has not been
entered by the plaintiff within 60 days of
the availability of default and absent a
showing of good cause, the court shall
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack
of prosecution.
(2) If a certificate of readiness for
trial has not been served and filed within
180 days of the filing date and absent a
showing of good cause, the court shall
dismiss the case without prejudice for lack
of prosecution.
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
:

j. Relief from judgment or order.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; excusable
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud#
etc. On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect
,,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaint i ff, Meadow l*---

action or. January 1
negligent

ih*?

their analysis

products (R. 20-36).

*. •

'• irms, Inc., i i J ed the instant

<- ieging that defendants were
s

Meadow Fresh Farms imitation milk
.>

for failure to prosecute - - Januar* .

-f action was dismissed
. ••im,

I'ennjfc l'*"]'e«J«^r i fk, Third District Court Judge (F

-^i^e J.
~

On May

22, 1990, Judge Frederics iMiiejeJ fin, « i Jf i 'lenyinq plaintiff's
motion to set aside the order of dismissal |H, 4HI-8/)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed its original Summons and Complaint
against defendants on April 25, 1983, alleging defendants issued
false information about plaintiffs imitation milk products in
several news releases and policy statements made in May through
September of 1981.
Release).

(See Addendum "A"; July 10, 1981, News

On July 19, 1984, plaintiff's counsel filed a notice

of withdrawal of counsel and served it upon defendants (R. 36465).

The Honorable Scott Daniels, Third District Court Judge,

dismissed plaintiff's complaint on September 27, 1985, for
failure to prosecute (R. 368).
On January 26, 1987, attorneys B. H. Harris and Joseph
M. Chambers filed an entry of appearance and a motion to vacate
the minute entry dismissing plaintiff's case (R. 370-75).

On

March 13, 1987, Judge Daniels denied plaintiff's motion to vacate
the judgment of dismissal (R. 379-81).
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
of dismissal and allowed plaintiff one year to refile under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-40 (1953), as amended (R. 383).
On January 14, 1988, attorneys B. H. Harris, George W.
Preston and Thomas L. Willmore filed an amended complaint on
behalf of the plaintiff which forms the basis of this appeal (R.
20-36).

On December 14, 1988, B. H. Harris, one of the attorneys

of record for plaintiff, withdrew as counsel (R. 424-25).
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Attuimey H a n is• notice of withdrawal
Mr. Roy Brog, President <

f

counsel was mailed to

Fn

i

Ori December 5, 1989, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,
rim in mi I'11 st r iii t ('in lit J u d g p , i s s u e d H J o r d e r t o s h o w c a u s e w h y t h e
case should not be dismissed f<
(R. 4 3 2 , 33)

: "osecute

H e explained that counsel's failure to appear

wni'iiliJ t»p CM in • nifred acquiescence in entry of an order of
dismissal (Id..).

T h e order to s I: i c >w c a u s e w a s • s e n t 1: o a 11 3 r n e y

George W. Preston, attorney of record for plaintiff
*-.*<•

(Id,).

', 19o5, ac o.^v ~.*n., the order to show :'

cause came - , regularly for hearing (R. 4 35) .
plaintiff failed to appear (.Id. )

i :c >ui isel fc : i : the

Judge Frederick entered an

order • : f d i sri tl ssa] * i 1 :hoi it prejudice on January 18, 1990 (.Id. ) .
On February 2 2 , 1 9 9 0 , attorney Steven Y, Alder filed a
notice of appearance of counsel and a motion to set aside the
order

:.

.=-..;

' - - tL ff explained that he had

failec to communicate with his previous attorney from Jaiiiiaiy to
early December of 1989 (Ld. )

U d g e Frederick entered an order

on M a y 2.

ill.- ii lion for an order to set

-*

aside the order of dismissal 1H, 48 J • H

f *w

Addendum

B" ;

Order).
(JI i in i • w i l l -

I it1 f (j it"

f hi * 11 i s in 1 s "i r J I , o n M a y x **

; 'J b U ,

plaintiff filed a third action against defendants which w a s
identical to his previous two actions.
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(See Brief of Appellant

at pp. 18-19).

The Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District

Court Judge, dismissed the third action without prejudice on
December 7, 1990, by reason of this appeal from Judge Frederick's
order (See Addendum "C", Order).

Plaintiff now appeals Judge

Frederick's order denying defendants' motion to set aside the
order of dismissal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff claims the lower court abused its discretion
in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute.

Plaintiff argues that its failure to communicate with

counsel for almost a year constitutes "excusable neglect" under
Rule 60(b)(1).

In contrast, Utah case law expressly rejects the

argument that a plaintiff's failure to communicate with counsel
constitutes excusable neglect sufficient to set aside an order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute.

In light of the fact that

plaintiff's cause of action is nearly a decade old, has been
lingering in the judicial system for more than seven years, was
previously dismissed for lack of prosecution, and was affirmed on
appeal as appropriately dismissed, the lower court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to set aside the order of dismissal
for failure to prosecute.
Plaintiff also requests this Court to decide whether he
may refile his cause of action under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-40
(1987), but only if this Court affirms the lower court's
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dismissal.

Because plaintiff did not raise the issue in the

lower court, this Court should not consider this issue raised for
the first time on appeal.

In any event, plaintiff essentially

requests this Court to issue an advisory opinion, a result which
is against judicial policy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN REFUSING TO SET ASIDE THE DISMISSAL FOR
FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
Plaintiff contends that the lower court erred in
refusing to set aside the order of dismissal for failure to
prosecute.

He asserts that "excusable neglect" existed

justifying from relief from the final judgment of dismissal.

He

requests this Court to reverse the lower court's dismissal and
remand this case for trial.

Plaintiff's claim should be

rejected.
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules Civil Procedure, provides that a
trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment if
"excusable neglect" is established.

The Utah Supreme Court

defines "'excusable neglect' as the exercise of 'due diligence'
by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances."
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Utah, 733 P.2d 130, 132
(Utah 1987).

While the Court has explained that a trial court

should be generally indulgent toward setting a judgment aside

-8-

where there is reasonable justification or excuse, the mere fact
that some basis may exist to set aside the default "does not
require the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in
refusing to do so when facts and circumstances support the
refusal."

Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92, 92 (Utah 1986).

More

specifically, the Court has ruled that where a party has been
negligent by not communicating with his attorney, the party may
not claim his attorney's neglect in failing to notify him of
proceedings as grounds for setting aside a default judgment.
Gardiner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429, 430 (Utah
1982).

See also Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d

65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973).
In the present case, plaintiff contended in the lower
court that he satisfied the conditions of Rule 60(b) due to
"excusable neglect on behalf of the defendant and/or plaintiff or
plaintiff's counsel and failure in communications which resulted
in confusion as to whether counsel had withdrawn from
representation or not."

(R. 186-87).

This explanation, however,

was rejected by Judge Frederick as insufficent to set aside the
dismissal.

Reviewing plaintiff's conduct in this case, it is

readily apparent that Judge Frederick was correct in concluding
that plaintiff's dilatory conduct was inexcusable.
The original complaint in this action was filed on
April 25, 1983, more than seven years prior to Judge Frederick's
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dismissal.

Approximately fifteen months after the original

filing, plaintiff's original counsel of record withdrew from the
case (R. 364). The reason stated for the withdrawal was that
plaintiff had recently reorganized and had retained in-house
counsel in the process (.Id.). Also, plaintiff had never paid any
of the bills that the original law firm had submitted (Id.. ) . On
August 29, 1985, an order to show cause was issued notifying
plaintiff that its action was in jeopardy and that a hearing
would be held on September 27, 1985 (R. 366). On the day of the
hearing, plaintiff and its counsel failed to appear and the case
was dismissed (I_d. ) .
Sixteen months thereafter, on January 26, 1987,
plaintiff filed a notice of appearance of counsel and request for
scheduling conference (R. 370). This occurred more than two and
a half years after plaintiff's original counsel had withdrawn.
On the same day, plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the minute
entry dismissing its case (R. 372). On March 13, 1987, Judge
Scott Daniels issued an order denying plaintiff's motion to
vacate (R. 378). Plaintiff appealed the order to the Utah
Supreme Court which affirmed, but granted plaintiff one year in
which to refile its action.
Ten months later, on January 6, 1988, plaintiff filed
its Amended Complaint (R. 385). After two more years of
inactivity by plaintiff, the lower court on December 5, 1989,
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issued an order to show cause indicating that "failure to appear
will be considered acquiescence in entry of an order of
dismissal."

(R. 431). Plaintiff and its counsel once again

failed to appear at the order to show cause hearing and the
action was dismissed on January 18, 1990 (R. 434) (See Addendum
"B"; Order).
On March 15, 1990, plaintiff moved to set aside the
dismissal, asking the lower court to excuse his dilatory behavior
(R. 183-90).

He contended that the failure to appear at the

order to show cause hearing was due to his and his counsel's
confusion as to whether or not he was indeed represented by
counsel.

(.Id.) This contention was not, however, supported by

the record.

Although it was correct that attorney B. H. Harris

withdrew from the case on December 14, 1988, he did so only on
his own behalf due to his appointment as a judge in the First
Circuit Court (R. 171). Had plaintiff contacted his attorney
over the next eleven months leading up to the lower court's order
to show cause, any confusion would easily have been remedied.
Plaintiff's alleged confusion did not relieve it of its
duty to diligently prosecute its case.

The reasoning of the Utah

Supreme Court in the case of Wilson v. Lambert, 613 P.2d 765
(Utah 1980) is helpful.

In Wilson, the plaintiffs contended that

they should be relieved from the lower court's dismissal for
failure to prosecute because their predecessor in interest, Mr.
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Baldwin, had unknowingly been without counsel when the action was
dismissed.

In response, the Wilson Court stated:

"It is . . .

immaterial that Plaintiff's predecessor was unwittingly without
counsel for a time before his death.

Mr. Baldwin was not

relieved of his duty to pursue his action by any failure of his
attorney to act - the matter should have been investigated within
a reasonable time."

Wilson, 613 P.2d at 768.

Likewise, plaintiff was not relieved of its duty to
diligently prosecute this action due to any confusion as to
whether or not it was represented by counsel.

Just as when

plaintiff's first action was dismissed, it was the district
court's own motion that renewed plaintiff's interest in the case.
Had the Court not moved sua sponte to dismiss, this case would
likely have remained idle.
Additionally, defendants have been prejudiced by
plaintiff's delay in prosecuting this action.

Since the original

filing of this action more than seven years ago, defendants have
undergone a considerable change of circumstances.

None of the

three named individuals represented by the Attorney General's
Office are still employed with the State agencies against whom
this lawsuit was filed (R. 323). One of the three is still
employed by the State, but in a different agency and in an
entirely different capacity (Id.).

Of the other two, one has

moved to Texas, and the other to the State of Washington (Id.).
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Neither of these two individuals have any continuing
employer/employee relations with the State of Utah.

The changes

of occupation and domicile have created difficulties and
prejudice for each of the named defendants and the agencies
involved in the lawsuit.
There are numerous reasons why a reinstatement of this
case would be a continuing burden on the parties involved.
First, reinstating the lawsuit would create a burden on the
individual defendants who would have to interrupt their personal
and business lives to travel to Utah in order to defend their
actions which occurred nearly a decade ago.
an undue burden on the agencies involved.

Second, it would be

Because none of the

individual defendants are currently employed by the defendant
agencies, other agency employees would be required to become
familiar with the facts and circumstances surrounding this
action.

These agency employees would have the difficulty of

trying to familiarize themselves with a matter that occurred
almost a decade ago.

Lastly, after lingering in the court system

for more than seven years, witnesses may no longer be available
for trial, and if available, may be unable to recall information
that is vital in defending this action.
In sum, plaintiff has been afforded ample opportunity
to prosecute this case.
opportunity.

Plaintiff, however, has abused the

After seven years of delay and two dismissals for
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lack of prosecution, plaintiff requests the judicial system to
condone his behavior by allowing him a third chance.

In light of

plaintiff's dilatory behavior, Judge Frederick's ruling should
not be considered an abuse of discretion.
POINT

II

PLAINTIFF CANNOT RAISE ISSUES FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
On appeal, plaintiff raises the issue of whether it
may, for a second time, utilize the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-40 (1987) which allows a plaintiff to refile an action
within one year after the reversal or failure of a cause of
action other than upon the merits.

However, because this issue

was not raised in the lower court, it should not be considered on
appeal.
Utah courts have long held that appellate issues must
be first raised in the trial court.

In James v. Preston, 746

P.2d 799 (Utah App. 1987), this Court explained that "matters not
raised in the pleading nor put in issue at the trial level may
not be raised for the first time on appeal."

Ld. at 801.

In the instant case, the issue of the legality of a
second refiling was not raised below and the lower court had no
"opportunity to make findings of fact or conclusions of law."
James, 746 P.2d at 801. Admittedly, plaintiff did raise the
issue in the subsequent action filed before Judge Rigtrup.
However, Judge Rigtrup's dismissal was not based on that issue
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and no appeal was taken.

Had plaintiff desired a ruling on the

refiling statute, he could have raised the issue before Judge
Frederick in his motion to set aside the judgment.

Plaintiff

should not be permitted to seek reversal of Judge Frederick's
ruling on the basis of a legal argument not presented below.
In reality, plaintiff's argument is premature.

If this

Court reverses Judge Frederick's dismissal order, the issue will
be moot.

If this Court affirms Judge Frederick's ruling and

plaintiff refiles its cause of action, the issue can then be
argued and decided.

In that Utah has a longstanding judicial

policy avoiding advisory opinions, plaintiff's premature claim
should not be considered in this appeal.

See Reynolds v.

Reynolds, 788 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants respectfully
request this Court to affirm the lower court's denial of
plaintiff's motion to set aside the order of dismissal.
DATED this (V

<day of February, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN"
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OR K E N N E T H B CREER
COMMISSIONER

147 North 200 West

Salt Lake City Utah 84103

801/S33 5421

J u l y 10, 1981
NEWS

E 5 L E A S E

WARNING ISSUED ON IMITATION MILK PRODUCT
A new food product is currently being marketed throughout the
state which is falsely represented and may pose a health risk for
certain individuals. The product called "Meadow Fresh" is an imitation lowfat milk and is offered to consumers on a distributor basis.
According to Archie Hurst, Director of the Division of Food
and Consumer Services* for the Utah Department of Agriculture, "Consumers
should be aware that Meadow Fresh is improperly labeled and makes
false advertising claims." "Meadow Fresh is an imitation product
and should not be considered a dairy product or a substitute for
milk," says Mr. Hurst.
Contrary to advertising claims, Meadow Fresh is not nutritionally
comparable to milk. It is, in fact, inferior to milk in several
nutrients, which is the reason for it being classified as an imitation product.
"The Department is concerned that dietary detriment may result
to individuals using this product as a sole replacement for milk,
especially for infants, growing children, the elderly and pregnant
and nursing mothers," says Mr. Hurst. "It is important that the
product not be used as an infant formula."
Janet Heins , a Public Health Nutritionist for the Utah State
^

O

Department of Health and Director of the WIC Program, states that
K
"Meadow Fresh does not meet the minimum standards of the Infant
^
Formula Act of 1980. This act establishes minimum levels of nutrients "
and standards for quality and safety in the manufacture of infant
formula. Furthermore, Meadow Fresh may not support normal infant
growth and development, and prolonged use of it in infant feeding
could be life threatening."

News Release
Warning Issued on Imitation Milk Product
July 10, 1981
Page 2
Meadow Fresh has also been purported to be useful for persons
who are allergic to milk. The Department is not aware of any
evidence to substantiate this claim. Components present in the
product indicate that persons allergic to milk would also be
allergic to Meadow Fresh.
In addition, ingredients present in the product have not been
proven to be effective in the treatment or cure of any known disease.
Mr. Hurst says "Consumers should also be aware that the nutrition information declared on the label is inaccurate." The label
states that the, product does not contain cholesterol when, in fact,
it does.
During the past few months, Meadow Fresh has prompted manv
consumer inquiries to the Department.
"We are very concerned that consumers may be misled by the
advertising claims made of this product,M says Mr.Hurst.

©

ADDENDUM B

« * ' • « *

PAUL S. FELT (A1055)
MARK 0. MORRIS (A4636)
RAY, QUINNEY t NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Attorneys for Utah State University
Department of Agriculture and Applied
Science, Von T. Mendenhall and
Barbara Prater
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SET
ASIDE ORDER OF DISMISSAL

UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Civil No. 880900171
Judge J, Dennis Frederick

vs.

Defendants.
ooOoo
Plaintiff's motion for an order to set aside this
Court's January 18, 1990 Order of Dismissal without prejudice
was noticed for decision on April 30, 1990.

After having reviewed

all of the pleadings in the case and after having reviewed the
»emoranda of points and authorities submitted in connection
with plaintiff's motion to set aside order of dismissal, including
the exhibits attached thereto, and for good cause shown,

EXHIBIT A

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaint
motion for order to set aside this Court's January 18# 1990
Order of Dismissal without prejudice is denied for the reasons
©ore particularly set forth in the defendants' memoranda in
opposition to plaintiff's motion.
DATED this

^?A day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

J. Dennis Frederick
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order
was served upon the following by depositing a copy^of the same
in the U. S. MaiIs, postage prepaid thereon, this °\
M^y, 1990:

day of

^

John P. Soltis
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Steven F. Alder
ALDER & ASSOCIATES
220 East 3900 South #16
Murray, Utah 84107
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ADDENDUM C

MftH
o W !
bio lu .•

Third Jud,cialDistnct

PAUL S. FELT (A1055) and
•.
MARK 0. MORRIS (A4636) o f ' 1 ^ r , ^ . ^ K _
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKERTiO! A-J v. — >Attorneys for Defendants Utah
State University Department of
Agriculture and Applied Science,
Von T. Mendenhall and Barbara Prater
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

DEC 07 1990
C*K"IY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
MEADOW FRESH FARMS, INC.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

vs.
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Civil No. 900902988CV

Defendants.

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup
ooOoo

Defendants' motion to dismiss came before this Court for
regularly scheduled hearing at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, November 26,
1990.

Plaintiff was represented by Marcus G. Theodore.

The State

of Utah and its related departments and individuals were
represented by Dan R. Larsen.

Defendants Utah State University

and its related departments and individual defendants were
represented by Mark O. Morris.

After considering the memoranda on

file and hearing arguments of counsel, and for good cause shown,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case be dismissed without
prejudice by reason of the appeal now pending of Civil No.
C88-00171, the predecessor case to this instant action.
DATED this

/ -^dav of December, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

Kenneth Rigtrup
District Court Jtiidge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26th day of November, 1990,
d true and correct copy of the foregoing Order of Dismissal was
served upon the following by depositing a copy of the same in the
U.S. Mails, postage prepaid thereon:
Dan R. Larsen
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Marcus G. Theodore
466 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102
^
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